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PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

*

By John R. Stevenson * and Bernard H. Oxman***
I.
INTRODUCrION

The United Nations General Assembly has convened a new Conference
on the Law of the Sea. Its object is to achieve comprehensive agreement on
the international law of the sea. Most ff not all members of the United
Nations, as well as other states, can be expected to attend the substantive
session in Caracas this summer.
The Conference will have before it the results of the work of the 91member UN Seabed Committee which has been carrying on preparations
for the Conference since 1970. The Committee's reports include draft
texts, usually in the form of alternatives, notably with respect to the
question of the legal regime for the deep seabeds and the prevention of
ocean pollution; proposals made by a large number of states on one or
more issues; and a comprehensive list of subjects and issues.1 To these
should be added a number of studies prepared by the UN Secretariat
at the Committee's request.
The Conference must likewise take into account the four Conventions 2
adopted by the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea on the basis of
texts prepared by the International Law Commission; relevant decisions
of the International Court of justice; the Declaration of Principles regarding the deep seabeds adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970; 3
and a vast array of official statements and scholarly writings regarding
the nature and content of the existing law of the sea.

0 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State or the U.S. Government.
*O Of the Board of Editors. Special Representative of the President for the Law
of the Sea Conference.
***Assistant Legal Adviser for Ocean Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
IReports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 UN GAOR Supp. 21, UN Doec. A/8021

(1970); 26 UN GAOR Svpp. 21, UN Doc. A/8421 (1971); 27 UN GAOR SuPP. 21,
UN Doc. A/8721 (1972); 28 UN GAOR Supp. 21, UN Doec. A/9021 (1973). Hereinafter abbreviated as 25, 26, 27, 28, REP. The 1973 Report is in six volumes; since
the texts of proposals submitted to Subcommittees I and III are not printed therein,
they are cited hereinafter by individual UN Doc. number.
2 Convention on the High Seas, 13 UST 2312; TIAS 5200, 450 UNTS 82; 52 AjIL 842
(1958). Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 UST 471; TIAS 5578; 499 UNTS 311;
52 AJIL 858 (1958). Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15
UST 1606; TIAS 5639; 516 UNTS 205; 52 AJIL 834 (1958). Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 17 UST 138; TIAS 5969;

559 UNTS 285; 52 AJIL 851 (1958).
3 CA Res. 2749, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. 28, at 24, UN Doe. A/8028 (1970).
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From a strictly legal perspective, the absence of definitive texts on important issues in itself renders the magnitude of the task impressive. A
hypothetical group of 150 completely disinterested experts would encounter
considerable difficulty in achieving timely and sensible results. Once it
is recognized that important political, security, environmental, economic,
and scientific interests are significantly affected by the rules of the law
of the sea, that these interests are divergent not only as between countries but within individual countries as well, and that governments are
frequently inclined to avoid difficult decisions as long as possible, it is
quite easy to conclude that the odds against a new law of the sea treaty
are overwhelming. There are, however, positive incentives for a timely
and successful conference which significantly affect the situation, and
lead most if not all countries to believe that a timely and successful Law
of the Sea Conference is in their interest.
The most important reason why states are pressing forward with the
Conference is widespread dissatisfaction with the existing legal regime or
lack of it in the oceans. Some believe that respect for certain aspects of
the traditional law of the sea is breaking down, and that interests protected by that traditional law are being jeopardized. This has been the
reaction, for example, to unilateral extensions of the territorial sea and
other forms of coastal state jurisdiction. Some believe that the traditional
law does not adequately protect current or anticipated interests. This
has been the reaction by many states to the conservation and economic
problems created by the development of large and highly mobile distantwater fishing fleets. Some believe that the absence of sufficiently precise
legal rules to deal with new or newly perceived problems and uses, such
as pollution of the marine environment and the development of technology
to exploit the deep seabeds, could prejudice their interests.
A -great deal of political and legal argumentation is heard in defense of
each of these perspectives. On the one hand, it is asserted that centuries
of legal development cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, it is
said that a large number of countries were unable to participate fully
in that development and should not be compelled to live with the results.
In fact, however, few if any delegations believe that all of existing law
should either be retained or discarded at the Conference.
Dissatisfaction with the existing situation does not, of course, mean that
the only solution is a new comprehensive multilateral treaty on the law
of the sea. However, a number of factors have combined to persuade most
governments that it is the best available solution.
The number of states involved in resolving a particular problem may
be large and may in fact present an unbalanced "regional" negotiating
situation. A coastal state interested in protecting its fishing interests off
its coast can only be assured of such protection if all actual or potential
users are bound by -themeasures taken. At a Law of the Sea Conference,
it can seek communities of interest with other coastal states and work
out a solution acceptable to both coastal -and distant-water fishing states.
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At a meeting of the states immediately concerned, it may be hopelessly
outnumbered by foreign states fishing off its coast.
In many situations, the problem is itself of global or nearly global magnitude. For example, passage through an important international strait
affects the coastal state or states, a large number of states with vessels
using the strait, and an even larger number of states with security or economic interests in the use of the strait by foreign vessels or aircraft.
The interrelationship of issues further complicates attempts at isolated
solutions. For example, the United States and other nations are prepared to agree to a universal extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles
provided there is adequate agreement on free transit of straits used for
international navigation. Concomitantly, many coastal nations have stated
that a commitment to limit their territorial sea to 12 miles would not be
desirable without special provision to protect their interests in living and
non-living resources beyond that limit. The respective positions of states
on the boundaries of coastal state resource jurisdiction are in turn affected
by the nature of the resource regime within those limits.
A further incentive for agreement derives from the international community's general interest in the success of these negotiations. While it
would not be accurate or helpful to regard the Law of the Sea Conference,
or any other UN effort, as a "test" of the efficacy of global multilateral
diplomacy, the political implications of failure to produce a timely treaty
would not be limited to the oceans. On the other hand, a timely and successful conference could instill new confidence in the United Nations and
would surely contribute to the strengthening of international law and
institutions generally.
Although many of the most important issues involved do not relate to
the relative economic development of states, some do; and, more importantly, some attempts have been made to polarize the negotiations
along developed-developing country lines. A number of delegations are
acutely aware of the danger this presents for a conference whose success
wvill be judged not by the mere adoption of a treaty but by the conclusion
of a treaty generally acceptable to both developed and developing countries. There have been favorable indications in the recent preparatory
meetings that enough, if not all, national and regional leaders will have a
sufficiently broad conception of this general problem, and of its relationship to broader interests, to make every effort to ensure the success of
the Conference.
For ease of reference, the issues involved in the law of the sea negotiations can be analyzed in accordance with the Seabed Committee's allocation of topics to its three Subcommittees of the whole. The first Subcommittee was concerned with an international regime and an international
organization (in UN parlance, international machinery) for the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; it established one working
group to deal with these issues. Subcommittee II had the broadest and
most complex mandate of all; it was concerned with most of the traditional
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law of the sea issues, including the territorial sea, straits, the high seas,
and fisheries, as well as the seabed within national jurisdiction; it established one working group of the whole. Subcommittee III was concerned
with pollution and scientific research; it established one working group
on pollution and one on scientific research and transfer of technology.
II.
THE SFABED BEYOND NATIONAL JiUsDIcnoN-SurBcommrrE

I

Draft articles bearing on the work of Subcommittee I, and narrative
working papers, were introduced by the United States, 4 the United Kingdom,5 France, Tanzania,7 the Soviet Union,8 Poland9 certain Latin American states, 10 certain landlocked and shelf-locked countries," Canada, 12 and
Italy.13 The comprehensive approach of Malta', to an ocean space treaty
also bears on this as well as virtually all other aspects of the negotiation.

In addition, proposals relating to archeological and historical treasures
found on the seabed were introduced by Turkey ", and Greece.10
In the working group of Subcommittee I, -the first such group to be
established, the focus has been on the preparation of a comprehensive
and consolidated set of texts illustrating areas of agreement and disagree4USA: Draft United Nations convention on the international sea-bed area; 25 REP.
130-76 (1970).
5United Kingdom: Working paper on international r6gime, 25 REP. 177-84 (1970);
United Kingdom: International sea-bed r6gime-proposals for elements of a convention,
26 REP. 83-91 (1971).
6France: Proposals for establishment of a r6gime for the exploration and the exploitation of the seabed, 25 Rn,. 185-90 (1970).
7
Tanzania: Draft Statute for an international sea-bed authority, 26 REP. 51-64
(1971).
8
USSR: Provisional draft article on use of the sea-bed for peaceful purposes, 26 REp.
67-75 (1971); USSR: Preamble to a treaty on the use of the sea-bed for peaceful
purposes, 28 RnP. II, 166 (1973).
9 Poland: Working paper concerning an international organization on exploration and
exploitation, 26 REP. 76-81 (1971).
10 Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela: Working paper on the
r6gime for the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, 26 RuP. 93-101 (1971).
"3Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands, Singapore: Preliminary working paper, 26 REP. 194-96 (1971).
3. Canada: International sea-bed r6gime and machinery working paper, 26 REP.
205-25 (1971).
's Italy: Articles on composition of the council, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.1/L.24 (July
24, 1973); Italy: Preliminary draft articles concerning basic principles of the r6gme
and regulations for the granting and administration of licenses for the exploration and
exploitation of minerals, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.I/L.28 (August 14, 1973).
14 Malta: Draft ocean space treaty, 26 REP. 105-93 (1971).
15 Turkey: Articles on archaeological and historical treasures, UN Doe. A/AC.138/
SC.I/L.21 (March 28, 1973).
16 Greece: Draft article on protection of archaeological and historical treasures, UN
Doe.A/AC.138/SC.I/L.25 (August 14, 1973).
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ment on the status, scope, and basic provisions of the international regime,

and the status and scope, functions, and powers of the international machinery. 7 This document was prepared initially by the chairman of the
working group, principally on the basis of proposals made by states, and
was elaborated within the working group. In the form transmitted by
the Subcommittee to the Committee and included in the Committee's
report to the UN General Assembly, it contains 52 articles and certain
additional texts. Disagreements are indicated therein either by the use
of square brackets or by alternative texts under each article.
It has been generally understood in the Committee's work that the
landward limits of the international seabed area will coincide with the
seaward limit of coastal state jurisdiction over the seabed resources, thus
in effect placing all seabed resource activities under the regulatory authority either of coastal states or of the international regime and machinery.
While the issue of the location of this boundary has a very significant bearing on the importance and nature of the international regime and machinery for the area beyond national jurisdiction, this issue has been discussed principally in Subcommittee II, and it will be addressed in connection with the preparatory work of that Subcommittee.
The large number of articles drafted on the subject of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is attributable to the inherent technical complexities of establishing both an international regime and an international
organization to deal with the exploration and exploitation of the resources
of a vast, but until recent years largely unknown and unused, area of this
planet. In many important respects, the effort is unprecedented, although
some important parallels can be drawn to the work of existing international
organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization.
The most critical problems involved concern three interrelated issues:
These are the nature of the resource exploration and exploitation system,
the functions and powers of the international organization, referred to in
the working group texts as the Authority, and the nature of the decisionmaking process. In large measure, the alternative texts included on a
variety of articles reflect the different positions of states on these issues.
The alternative approaches to the resource exploration and exploitation
system are set out in Article 9, under the title "Who May Exploit the
Area." They are as follows: 18
[Alternative A]
All exploration and exploitation activities in the Area shall be conducted by a Contracting Party or group of Contracting Parties or
natural or juridical persons under its or their authority or sponsorship,
subject to regulation by the Authority and in accordance with the
rules regarding exploration and exploitation set out in these Articles.
17 Working Group I, Texts illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement: Report

of Subcommittee I, Annex III, 28 REP. II, 39 (1973); see also Working Group I:
Texts illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement; 27 REP. 81-108 (1972).
s28 REP. II, 57--8 (1973).
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[Alternative B]
All activities of scientific research and exploration of the Area and
exploitation of its resources and other related activities shall be conducted by the Authority directly or, if the Authority so determines,
through service contracts or in association with persons natural or
juridical.
[Alternative C]
All exploration and exploitation activities in the Area shall be conducted by the Authority either directly or in such other manner as it
may from time to time determine. If it considers it appropriate'and
subject to such terms and conditions as it may determine the Authority
may decide to -grant licenses for such activities to a Contracting Party
or 'group of Contracting Parties or through them to natural or juridical
persons under its or their authority or sponsorship, including multinational corporations or associations.
Licenses may also be issued for this purpose to international organizations active in the field at the discretion of the Authority.
[Alternative D]
All exploration and exploitation activities in the Area shall be conducted by a Contracting Party or group of Contracting Parties or
natural or juridical persons under its or their authority or sponsorship,
subject to regulation by the Authority and in accordance with the
rules regarding exploration and exploitation set out in these Articles.
The Authority may decide, within the limits of its financial and technological resources, to conduct such activities.
A note to Article 9 indicates that consideration should be given to
whether or not to set out ". . . as is done in some proposals, the general
rules regarding resource activities in the Area."
These could include, inter alia, according to the type of administration
adopted as regards exploration and exploitation, rules on: notice to
mariners and other safety procedures, areas to be allotted, work requirements, work plans, inspection, service contracts, licensing, joint
ventures, fees payable, revocation of service contracts, revocation of
licenses and integrity of investments...
It has been increasingly accepted in the preparatory work that both
public and private entities would in fact engage in exploration and exploitation and that direct exploitation with the Authority's own personnel, capital, and equipment is not feasible. Accordingly, the issue
has become essentially one of employing a nondiscretionary licensing system, or a system of negotiated service contracts and joint ventures with
discretion in the Authority to choose between investors, or a combination
of the two systems. Articles 38 and 44 contemplate that a special organ of
the Authority would perform these functions. The "Operations Commission" is the organ frequently associated with licensing, while the "Enterprise" is the term for the organ usually associated with the contractual
exploitation system. The United States has strongly insisted on nondiscretionary access on satisfaction of agreed conditions prescribed in advance,
preferably in the treaty itself.
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Although broad philosophical differences underlie these approaches, certain key issues are reflected in all of them. Will the Authority deal only
with states, or with private investors directly, or both? Will the system
ensure reasonable and secure investment conditions and permit adequate
planning and predictability for a sufficient period of time? Will potential
consumers be assured of supply at reasonable cost? How can the desires
of developing countries to share the benefits and have an opportunity for
participation be accommodated?
The United States has been strongly of the view that general rules dealing with these matters should be included in the treaty, rather than left
to the Authority's discretion. This issue has for the moment been left
open (as indicated in the note to Article 9 referred to above).
There appears to be broad agreement that the Authority would exercise
certain functions and powers in respect of resource exploration and exploitation as such, although this agreement is conditional in the case of
many countries, including the United States, on the nature of the Authority's decisionmaking processes.
In some cases, there are differences over whether a particular function
should be performed by the Authority at all. One difference is occasioned
by the fears of certain land producers of hard minerals and petroleum that
seabed production may adversely affect the prices of these minerals. Two
related questions are involved:
First will there be an adverse impact on prices in the light of growing
world demand for these products? As for petroleum, the limits of coastal
state economic jurisdiction being discussed render the likelihood of large
scale, economically viable production in the international area highly remote. While hard minerals are expected to be produced principally from
manganese nodules from the deep seabed within the international area,
there is considerable doubt as to the likelihood of adverse impact, except
in the case of cobalt, where the effect will be largely limited to only one
state where cobalt is produced as a copper byproduct. It should also be
noted that nickel will be the primary metal of economic interest for a
considerable time. The world's major producers of nickel are not developing countries.
Second, what, if anything, should the Authority do about such price
declines if they occur? Some states would propose some means of assistance to the affected land producers by the Authority, while others propose
price or production controls. The latter proposal, which has been strongly
opposed by the United States, could undercut rights of access and the
stability of investment conditions, as well as the interests of consumers,
and would be discriminatory if applied solely to production in the international area.
The problem of the decisionmaking process is in essence one of adequately protecting the interests of all concerned. Decisions by a majority
or two-thirds voting majority in an Assembly (the plenary organ of the
Authority), as proposed by a number of developing countries, cannot
assure such a result from the perspectives of those states and their nationals
most likely to be involved in deep seabed activities.

TE
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A state normally becomes bound by new international rules by agreeing
to them. It is widely recognized, on the one hand, that only a limited
number of the necessary rules and regulations may be included in the
treaty itself and, on the other hand, that a requirement of express universal agreement on additional rules and regulations for seabed exploitation would probably prove unworkable. Thus, the problem is one of providing states with sufficient assurances in the treaty so that they will consent in advance to be bound by certain rules adopted through the prescribed procedures. The establishment of precise treaty criteria governing
the scope of rules, subject to dispute settlement procedures, is one approach
that has been suggested. The establishment of an expert nonpolitical commission that drafts rules after consultation with all member states is another.
The requirement of approval by a Council of limited size, with adequately balanced representation and voting procedures, is for some an
indispensable element. Article 35 indicates a substantial difference of
view on this critical matter. For others, approval by a substantial proportion of all member states is equally indispensable. In this connection,
some have proposed that the Assembly vote on rules submitted by the
Council, while others have proposed that the Council submit rules directly
to the Contracting Parties for review and that the rules would not go into
effect if one-third or more object within a specified period. The United
States has -argued for the latter system, noting that it would not be practicable for the Assembly to meet often or in continuous session, and that
states may wish to consult a variety of experts and agencies in their respective capitals before reaching a final decision and accordingly would probably not wish their representatives to have to make rapid decisions in a
plenary organ. Similar procedures are, of course, used by other international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Finally, the timely availability of impartial dispute settlement machinery,
applicable both to disputes between states and operators and disputes
with organs of the Authority, is considered essential by a number of states,
including the United States.
III.
COASTAL STATE JuusDIcnoN-SuBcommrrE

II

While the international area beyond coastal state jurisdiction has received
more attention than any other area, the heart of the negotiations, in terms
of achieving a generally acceptable agreement, is the extent and nature
of coastal state jurisdiction in the coastal area. This has been the subject
matter with which Subcommittee II has been principally concerned, although
it also involves the most controversial aspects of Subcommittee III's work.
Because of procedural questions with respect to the organization of
Subcommittee II's work as well as the political importance of the questions involved, this Subcommittee has, on the surface, made less progress
than the others in terms of obtaining agreement on single or alternative
texts. However, the discussion in the Subcommittee and its working group
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and the corridor negotiations have indicated the broad lines of a compromise between coastal, maritime, and international interests in the
coastal area which must clearly form the basic ingredients of a generally
acceptable law of the sea package. The key elements are a 12-mile territorial sea accompanied, on the one hand, by international guarantees of
transit through and over international straits up to 24 miles in width overlapped by the 12-mile territorial sea, and, on the other hand, by broad
coastal state resource management jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile territorial sea that does not result in interference with navigation and other
nonresource uses. The most difficult issues in respect of marine pollution
and scientific research with which Subcommittee III has dealt also relate
to this area of coastal state jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile territorial sea.
TerritorialSea and Straits Used for InternationalNavigation
It is with respect to nonresource uses of the oceans-principally navigation and overflight-that the greatest concern has been expressed regarding the deterioration of respect for traditional law, and in particular the
freedoms of the high seas. The preparatory negotiations reveal very widespread agreement on protection for these uses of the oceans.
There is perhaps broader agreement on the inclusion of a 12-mile maximum limit for the territorial sea in a final treaty than on any other issue.
However, it must be emphasized that for many states this is conditioned
upon satisfactory resolution of other issues in the treaty, particularly those
concerning straits and coastal resources. Among those few proposals that
do not contemplate a 12-mile limit, only the articles submitted by Brazil
would establish a full territorial sea with control over navigation and overflight out to 200 nautical miles. 19 The similar proposal of Uruguay in fact
limits general control over navigation and overflight to 12 nautical miles, 20
the 200-mile zone of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the proposal of Ecuador,
Panama, and Peru similarly includes a narrower zone of unspecified breadth
for navigational controls, " and the 200-mile zone of national ocean space
proposed by Malta also distinguishes a 12-mile zone for navigation purposes.- , The Chinese proposal does not specify a precise maximum limit
for the territorial sea.2 3
The nature of the legal regime for the territorial sea generally has not
been a major issue. Very few proposals have dealt with it at all, and
10 Brazil: Draft articles containing basic provisions on the question of the maximum
breadth of the territorial sea and other modalities or combinations of legal r6gimes
of coastal State sovereignty, jurisdiction or specialized competences, 28 IEP. III, 29
(1973); 12 ILM 1222 (1973).
', Uruguay: Draft treaty articles on the territorial sea, 28 1ErP. III, 23 (1973).
21 Ecuador, Panama and Peru: Draft articles for inclusion in a convention on the
law of the sea, Working paper, 28 RE:,. III, 30 (1973); 12 ILM 1224 (1973).
2 Malta: Preliminary draft articles on the delimitation of coastal State jurisdiction
in ocean space and on the rights and obligations of coastal States in the area under
their jurisdiction, 28 Rm. III, 35 (1973).
23 China: Worldng paper on sea area within the limits of national jurisdiction, 28
rxp. 111, 1 (1973); 12 ILM 1230 (1973).
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most states seem content to continue in force the rules contained in the
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
24
Zone.
The principal problem arises in connection with international straits
overlapped by a 12-mile territorial sea. In the negotiating context, proposals regarding the regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea can
be seen in large measure as concerned primarily with the regime in straits
overlapped by the territorial sea, and in opposition to proposals for a regime
of "free transit" in straits used for international navigation presented early
20
in the negotiations by the United States 2 5 and by the USSR.
A simple solution to the straits problem might have been one that excluded straits from any provision permitting the extension of the territorial
sea, at least where such extension did not leave a suitable high seas corridor for navigation and overflight. However, it was recognized that this
might entail broader restrictions on coastal state rights than was necessary
to protect transit, and that a corridor might be difficult to establish in
some circumstances. Accordingly, the United States proposed that in
straits used for international navigation, vessels and aircraft in transit
should enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight for the purpose
of transit as they have on the high seas, but with coastal state authority
to establish suitable corridors to which such transit would be restricted.21
In explaining the unacceptability of innocent passage as a guarantee of
transit, the United States has noted three reasons among others:
(1) Innocent passage is defined by the Territorial Sea Convention 28
as passage that does not prejudice the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal state. Some coastal states have interpreted this language as permitting them selectively to control or interfere with passage by ships of
other states on the basis, for example, of flag or destination or the character
of the vessel or cargo.
(2) Innocent passage under the Convention requires submarines to
navigate on the surface.
(3) Innocent passage does not include a right of overflight of the territorial sea.
In response to the concerns of coastal states regarding safety, of navigation and pollution, the United States has also suggested adherence to
international standards for pollution control, mandatory application of
international traffic separation schemes, and strict liability for accidents
caused by failure to adhere to such schemes and similar ICAO air navigation regulations.
24 Supra note 2.
25 USA: Draft articles on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries, 26
REP. 241-45 (1971).
28 USSR: Draft articles on straits used for international navigation, 27 REP. 162-63
(1972).
27 USA: Draft articles on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries,
supra note 25.
2
8Art. 14, supra note 2.
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The Soviet straits article elaborates specific duties of the flag state with
respect to transit, an approach which appears to seek a means of accommodating the need to respect certain coastal state interests with the need
to avoid coastal state interference.
Those states opposed to free transit, primarily certain straits states but by
no means all of them, argue in essence that innocent passage should apply
to all parts of the territorial sea, including the territorial sea overlapping
straits. Accordingly, their proposals are written in terms that apply to
29
the territorial sea generally. This is the case with the Chinese proposal
and ,ith the proposal of Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, the
Philippines, Spain, and Yemen.-" Both proposals speak in terms of innocent
passage but are more restrictive of navigation than current rules of innocent
passage. Fiji has also introduced very elaborate articles on innocent passage which
are also, in some respects, more restrictive than the current
1
3

regime.

The proposal of Malta contemplates a system of coastal state regulation
based on regulations established by, and subject to review by, an international organization, with compulsory dispute settlement procedures in
the event of disagreement. 2
The Declaration of the Organization of African Unity states:
That the African States in view of the importance of international
navigation through straits used as such endorse the regime of innocent passage in principle but recognize the need for further precision
of the regime.'
The negotiation of specific articles relating to straits, of course, requires
some understanding as to their applicability. The Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone prohibits the suspension of innocent passage in straits used for international navigation between one part
of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea
of another state. The U.S. straits proposal uses the same definition in
connection with free transit. 34 However, this proposal as well as others
specify that they do not affect specific agreements applicable to particular
straits (e.g., the Montreux Convention in the case of the Turkish Straits);
and this exception appears to be idely accepted. Malta's proposal refers
20 China: Working paper on sea area within the limits of national jurisdiction, supra
note 23.
"i Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Spain, and Yemen:
Draft articles on navigation through the territorial sea including straits used for international navigation, 28 R1P. III, 3 (1973).
31Fiji: Draft articles relating to passage through the territorial sea, 28 REP. III,
91 (1973); 12 ILM 1251 (1973).
- Malta: Preliminary draft articles on the delimitation of coastal State jurisdiction
in ocean space and on the rights and obligations of coastal States in the area under
their jurisdiction, supra note 22.
33 Organization of African Unity: Addis Ababa Declaration, 28 REP. II, 4 (1973);
12 ILM 1200 (1973).
34 USA: Draft articles on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries,
supra note 25.
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in relevant part to "straits less than twenty-four miles wide which are, or
can be, used for international navigation." 15 The proposals of certain
straits states contain a qualified prohibition on suspension of innocent
passage "through straits used for international navigation which form part
of the territorial sea." - The Soviet proposal for freedom of transit refers
to "straits used for international navigation between one part of the high
seas and another part of the high seas." 3T The Italian proposal for free
transit follows the Geneva Convention definition, but then excludes from
free transit and applies innocent passage to straits which are not more
than six miles wide, lie between the coasts of the same state, and are near
other routes of communication between the parts of the sea connected by
the straits. 38
There can be little doubt from the preparatory negotiations of the critical importance for a successful conference of adequate guarantees of transit
in straits. Most states which have been silent on the issue appear to understand this. No state can be expected to agree to subject its communications with the rest of the world to the discretion of another state, nor
is it clear whether any state would in fact gain by the acquisition of a
discretionary right to interfere with transit of straits where the exercise
of that right would be a matter of such fundamental concern to so many
others.

Proposals regarding archipelagos present potential difficulty for navigation and overflight. Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, and the Philippines 31have
proposed that "archipelagic states" should be able to enclose all waters
lying within their outermost islands as "archipelagic waters" in which only
innocent passage by ships would be permitted, which could be limited
by coastal state regulation and confined to corridors designated by that
state. There are basic questions concerning the definition of an archipelago,
that is, the precise area than can be enclosed, as well as navigation and
overflight rights within the area. Moreover, although island nations would
have very considerable resource rights -within an archipelago on the basis
of coastal state resource jurisdiction under a law of the sea treaty without
any special provisions regarding archipelagos, it should be noted that these
archipelago proposals do not provide for any coastal state duties regarding resources within the archipelago and that the effect of these proposals could be to extend resource jurisdiction further seaward of the
island group than would otherwise be the case.
85 Malta: Preliminary draft articles on the delimitation of coastal State jurisdiction
in ocean space and on the rights and obligations of coastal States in the area under
their jurisdiction, supra note 22.
86 Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Spain, and Yemen:
Draft articles on navigation through the territorial sea, including straits used for international navigation, supra note 30.
87 USSR: Draft article on straits used for international navigation, supra note 26.
88 Italy: Draft article on straits, 28 REP. III, 70 (1973); 12 ILM 1230 (1973).
8
9 Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines: Draft articles on archipelagoes, 28
REP. III, 102 (1973); 12 ILM 1263 (1973).
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The United Kingdom archipelago proposal 40 attempts a solution to the
basic problems of definition and of navigation and overflight. Like the
proposal of Fiji and others, it limits the application of the principle to
island states. The proposal is that no baseline connecting outermost points
on the outermost islands may be longer than 48 nautical miles and that
the ratio of the area of the sea to the area of land territory within the
perimeter must not exceed five to one. The U.K. proposal would apply
the same regime, under the Convention, as would govern straits used for
international navigation to those parts of archipelagic waters used, before ratification of the Convention, as routes for international navigation
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or
the territorial sea of another state. In all other parts of archipelagic waters, innocent passage would apply. If it were to satisfy the stipulated
criteria, a state could declare itself to be an archipelagic state on ratifying
or acceding to the Convention by filing a declaration, chart, and accompanying certification regarding these criteria. This would include a list
of routes used for international navigation, which could be modified under
specific treaty articles. Compulsory dispute settlement procedures could
be invoked as to the application of the articles.
Coastal State Resource Jurisdiction
The problem of coastal state resource jurisdiction beyond the territorial
sea involves more interests of more states than any other problem in the
law of the sea negotiations. It is therefore not surprising that more proposals of more different countries deal with this problem, or certain aspects
of it, than any other.
41
However, particularly in this area, numbers can be misleading. Ten
of some 27 different resource proposals deal with the concept of a coastal
state exclusive economic zone or analogous approaches, and their application. Six 42 deal essentially with the problem of landlocked and other
"-United Kingdom: Draft article on the rights and duties of archipelagic States, 28
REP. III, 99 (1973); 12 ILM 1259 (1973).
41 Conference of the Caribbean Countries on Problems of the Sea: Text of the Santo
Domingo Declaration, 27 RP. 70-72 (1972); 66 AJIL 918 (1972); 11 ILM 892
(1972); African States Regional Seminar on Law of the Sea held in Yaounde: General Report, 27 REP. 73-76 (1972); Kenya: Draft articles on exclusive economic
zone concept, 27 REP. 180-82 (1972); Organization of African Unity: Addis Ababa
Declaration, supra note 33; Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela: Draft articles of treaty,
28 REP. III, 19 (1973); Iceland: Jurisdiction of coastal States over natural resources
of the area adjacent to their territorial sea, 28 REP. III, 23 (1973); China: Working
paper on sea area within the limits of national jurisdiction, supra note 23; Argentina:
Draft articles, 28 REP. III, 78 (1973); Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United
Republic of Tanzania and Zaire: Draft articles on exclusive economic zone, 28 REP,. III,
87 (1973); 12 ILM 1246 (1973); Pakistan: breadth of territorial sea and boundaries of
exclusive economic zone, 28 REP. III, 106 (1973).
4-Netherlands: Working paper concerning the concept of an intermediate zone, UN
Doe. A/AC.138/86 (March 16, 1973); Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal,
Netherlands, Singapore: Preliminary working paper, supra note 11; Afghanistan, Austria,
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geographically disadvantaged states. Four 43 deal primarily with delimitation between opposite or adjacent states. Three 44 concern only seabed

resources, while nine 45 primarily, concern fisheries.
By the end of 1971 tentative steps had been taken toward concrete
solutions of the problems of coastal state resource jurisdiction. Four specific proposals had been introduced, two by the United States on seabed
resources 4 6 and fisheries 47 respectively, one by seven landlocked and
shelf-locked states dealing with seabed resources,48 and a comprehensive
draft treaty by Malta.4 9 In a broad sense, the major types of alternatives
were already foreshadowed by these proposals.
As 1972 came to a dose, the alternatives were more clearly evident, as
was the importance of fisheries to an overall solution. The Declaration
of Santo Domingo and the Report of the Yaounde Seminar,"0 as well as
Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal, and Singapore: Draft articles on resource jurisdiction of coastal
States beyond the territorial sea, 28 REP. I1, 85 (1973); 12 ILM 1243 (1973); Uganda
and Zambia: Draft articles on the proposed economic zone, 28 REP. III, 89 (1973); 12
ILM 1249 (1973); Jamaica: Draft articles on regional facilities for developing geographically disadvantaged coastal States, 28 BEP. III, 110 (1973); Netherlands: Proposal
concerning an intermediate zone, 28 BEP. I1, 111 (1973); 12 ILM 1271 (1973).
43 Turkey: Draft article related to the following items: 2.3.1; 5.3; 6.7.2, 28 Bi-_.
III, 22 (1973); see also Tunisia and Turkey: Amendments to the Turkish draft articles,
28 REP. III, 71 (1973); Romania: Working paper on certain specific aspects of the
r6gime of islands in the context of delimitation of the marine space between neighbouring States, 28 REP. I1, 106 (1973); Japan: Principles on the delimitation of coastal
seabed area, 28 REP. II, 111 (1973); 12 ILM 1270 (1973).
4 USA: Draft article for a chapter on the rights and duties of States in the coastal
sea-bed economic area, 28 REP. I1, 75 (1973); 12 ILM 1235 (1973); Afghanistan,
Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands, Singapore: Preliminary working paper,
supra note 11; USSR: Rough draft of basic provisions on the question of the outer limit
of the continental shelf, 28 REP. HI, 28 (1973); 12 ILM 1223 (1973).
45USA: Revised draft fisheries articles, 27 REP. 175-79 (1972); see also USA:
Working paper on special considerations regarding the management of anadromous
fishes and highly migratory oceanic fishes, 28 REP. II, 11 (1973); USSR: Draft
article on fishing, 27 REP. 158-61 (1972); Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
and the USSR: Declaration on principles of rational exploitation of the living resources of the seas and oceans, 27 REP. 78-80 (1972); Australia and New Zealand:
Principles for a fisheries rigime, 27 RE,. 183-87 (1972); Japan: Proposal for a
r6gime of fisheries on the high seas, 27 Baa. 188-96 (1972); Canada: Working paper
on management of the living resources of the sea, 27 REP. 164-74 (1972); Canada,
India, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Sri Lanka: Draft articles on fisheries, UN Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.38 and Corr. 1, (July 16, 1973); Ecuador, Panama, and Peru:
Draft articles on fisheries in national and international zones in ocean space, 28 RrP.
HI, 107 (1973); 12 ILM 1267 (1973); Zaire: Draft articles on fishing, 28 EP. III,
114 (1973).
46 USA: Draft United Nations convention on the international sea-bed area, supra
note 4.
47USA: Draft articles on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries,
supra note 25.
48 Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands, Singapore: Preliminary working paper, supra note 11.
49 Malta: Draft ocean space treaty, supra note 14.
15Conference of the Caribbean Countries on problems of the sea: Text of the
Santo Domingo Declaration, supra note 41; African States Regional Seminar on Law
of the Sea held in Yaounde: General Report, supra note 41.
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draft articles by Kenya 5 1 set out the concept of an exclusive economic
zone or patrimonial sea. The Moscow Declaration, 52 and fisheries proposals by the USSR 5 3 and Japan-" emphasized an international approach
to fisheries problems. Canada 55 and the United States 56 addressed with
greater precision the problem of harmonizing coastal state jurisdiction with
the objectives of fisheries management, while Australia and New Zealand
7
took a step toward reconciling the aternatives.5
In important respects, 1973 was a year for elaboration. Both the Santo
Domingo Declaration and the later Declaration of the Organization of
African Unity 61 were refined into treaty texts. 55 A specific application
of the concept of the exclusive economic zone to fisheries was incorporated
in a proposal introduced by six states from different regions.60 A large
number of drafts dealing with specific aspects of the problem were introduced.
One underlying assumption of all these proposals seems to have been
that the nonresource uses referred to in the High Seas Convention 61 will
be protected beyond a 12-mile territorial sea. Some of the proposals
specifically recognize freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of
submarine cable and pipelines, while others use more general formulations.
Another common element has been the establishment of extensive coastal
state rights over resources. The issue does not appear to be whether
broad coastal state resource jurisdiction can emerge from the Conference
for this seems to be understood as a basic condition of general agreement.
The critical issue is rather whether there can be agreement on sufficient
treaty safeguards for the interests of other states and the international
community in general to permit-or in the view of some, to justify-widespread agreement on such broad jurisdiction.
As for the limits of this coastal state economic jurisdiction, the distance
of 200 nautical miles has the broadest support, particularly among proponents of an exclusive economic zone. For some, particularly African
states, this is a uniform limit proposed for a coastal zone involving jurisdiction over fisheries, seabed minerals, pollution, and scientific research.
51 Kenya: Draft articles on exclusive economic zone concept, supra note 41.
52 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR: Declaration on principles of rational exploitation of the living resources of the seas and oceans, supra
note 45.
53 USSR: Draft article on fishing, supra note 45.
t4 Japan: Proposal for a r6gime of fisheries on the high seas, supra note 45.
55 Canada: Working paper on management of the living resources of the sea, supra
note 45.
56USA: Revised draft fisheries articles, supra note 45.
57 Australia and New Zealand: Principles for a fisheries r6gime, supra note 45.
51 OAU: Addis Abada Declaration, supra note 33.
59 Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela: Draft articles of treaty, supra note 41; Algeria,
Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zaire: Draft articles on exclusive economic zone, supra note 41.
60 Canada, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Sri Lanka: Draft articles on
fisheries, supra note 45.
61 Supra note 2.
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For others, including most Latin American states and other states with
broad continental margins, jurisdiction over seabed resources (but not
fisheries) would extend to the outer edge of the continental margin beyond 200 miles. Since coastal species of fish migrate beyond 200 miles
in certain places, a system of coastal state preferential rights beyond the
200-mile zone has been proposed by a number of states, including some
African states. 62 The U.S. fisheries proposal would establish coastal state
jurisdiction over coastal species and anadromous species such as salmon
throughout their migratory range.
A number of landlocked and shelf-locked states proposed a limit of
200 meters depth or 40 nautical miles for coastal state seabed jurisdiction,
with an additional intermediate zone of 40 nautical miles in which the
coastal state would have preferential and veto rights over exploitation.
The USSR proposed a limit of the 500 meter isobath or 100 miles, whichever is further from shore, for coastal state seabed jurisdiction.
In addition, there appears to be widespread agreement that coastal
state jurisdiction over nonliving resources should be exclusive in the
sense that the coastal state would have discretion with respect to access
to, and the disposition of those resources. The only exceptions have been
the proposal of Uganda and Zambia that this jurisdiction would be exercised jointly by coastal and landlocked states in a region or subregion,62
and the proposal of the Netherlands for limited rights of access by "geographically disadvantaged States" off the coast of "geographically advantaged States." 64
Finally, there appears to be increasing recognition that coastal state
jurisdiction over fisheries will be accompanied by treaty obligations regarding access by other states in specified circumstances.
(1) Seabed Resources- There are only two systems under consideration
for seabed exploitation. One is based on coastal state jurisdiction, the
other on an international regime and organization for the area beyond
coastal state jurisdiction. To the extent that the only interest served
in areas under coastal state jurisdiction would be those of the nearest
coastal state, an irreconcilable dispute over the limits of that jurisdiction,
and accordingly the limit of the international seabed area, necessarily
develops. If, on the other hand, other states' concerns with broad coastal
state jurisdiction can be accommodated, the location of the outer limit of
that jurisdiction becomes a less difficult issue.
One problem with broad coastal state resource jurisdiction is that of
protecting freedom of navigation. Fortunately, all proposals contemplate express treaty protection of navigation in areas of resource jurisdiction. However, great care will be needed to prevent expansion of
such jurisdiction through unilateral interpretation of what is necessary
to protect resource interests in ways that might adversely affect navigation.
62 Canada, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Sri Lanka: Draft articles on
fisheries, supra note 45.
63 Uganda and Zambia: Draft articles on the proposed economic zone, supra note 42.
64 Netherlands: Proposal concerning an intermediate zone, supra note 42.
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Another problem to which exclusive coastal state seabed minerals jurisdiction gives rise concerns protection of the marine environment from
pollution from seabed exploration and exploitation activities. Whatever
may be said regarding the discretion of a state to pollute its land areas,
there is no assurance that pollution from vast seabed areas off the coast
will affect only the nearest coastal state. It is in the interests of coastal
states themselves to agree to observe certain minimum international environmental standards elaborated with the participation of all, while retaining the right to impose higher standards with respect to seabed resource
activities under their jurisdiction.
A third problem relates to the stability of such foreign investment as a
coastal state permits in the seabed area subject to its resource jurisdiction.
Most of the world's offshore oil reserves are found in the continental margins off the coast, and these constitute a large and increasingly important
part of total global reserves. The technological and capital requirements
for offshore oil development are considerable and, for most countries, not
indigenously available.
It is clear that the potential stability of investment is increasingly affecting both the availability of technology and capital and the relative
economic rent in different countries. Investors are increasingly diverting
capital to less economic areas of lower political risk. This helps neither
the coastal developing country nor the consumer.
In addition, we have already witnessed far too many disputes over the
taking of foreign investments. If a principal objective of the Law of the
Sea Conference is to prevent conflict over ocean uses, then this is one
problem that clearly merits closest attention. It is not merely a problem
of guaranteeing property rights; it is one of ensuring a stable system of
expectations among producing and consunming nations alike, upon which
plans may be based in a time of increasing energy problems.
No one contests the legitimate desire of a coastal state to maximize
its economic return from seabed mineral resources. Its right to be a tough
negotiator and even to stipulate in advance the terms of any agreement
with investors-whether a license, service contract, or joint venture--is
also uncontested. But its practical ability to derive maximum benefit from
its seabed resource jurisdiction is in fact adversely affected to the extent
that the investor fears the bargain will not be kept. The greater this risk,
the greater the tendency to avoid the investment or compensate for the
risk in terms of rate of return.
Accordingly, the United States has proposed that contracts with foreign
investors be respected, that expropriation be subject to just compensation,
and that resolution of these problems be subject to compulsory dispute
settlement procedures which can be initiated by the coastal state, the state
of the nationality of the investor, or if the latter does not act, the investor.6 5
This accomplishes what the entire treaty should accomplish for the oceans:
the establishment of common expectations; the narrowing and depoliticiza65 USA: Draft articles for a chapter on the rights and duties of States in the coastal
sea-bed economic area, supra note 44.
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tion of disputes that do arise; and the resolution of problems through
impartial legal processes.
Finally, it is clear that differences of opinion regarding the limits of
coastal state economic jurisdiction relate in important respects to the
problem of allocation of benefits. The problem is most clearly evident in
the case of a landlocked country. If coastal states enjoy all the benefits
from areas under their jurisdiction, the broader that jurisdiction, the smaller
the international seabed area from which all countries will enjoy benfits.
Moreover, there are also coastal states with similar problems. Some are
shelf-locked, that is, they have limited possibilities for extending their
jurisdiction far offshore because of their geographic situation. This, for
example, is the case with states that border on enclosed or semienclosed
seas, or in other areas such as the Gulf of Guinea where the coastline is
concave. In addition, the resource potential of different offshore areas
varies greatly. Since petroleum is most likely to be found in continental
margins, the absence of a broad continental margin seriously reduces the
potential benefits, whatever the limits of jurisdiction may be.
A number of solutions have been proposed. One is to establish the
limits of coastal state jurisdiction so that substantial oil reserves likely to
be exploited in the near future are within the international area. This,
of course, creates difficulties in view of the desires and expectations of
coastal states with respect to economic jurisdiction. The long debates
over the continental margin beyond 200 miles indicate that even a 200mile limit of coastal state economic jurisdiction is not completely satisfactory to a significant number of coastal states.
Another approach has been to establish an intermediate zone of mixed
coastal and international authority, running from relatively narrow to
relatively broad limits. The original U.S. trusteeship proposal was in essence such a solution,"" as was the 1971 working paper introduced by
certain landlocked and shelf-locked countriesY7 The problem with these
proposals is that, to varying degrees, they entailed limitations on coastal
state resource management policy that many coastal states considered undesirable, potentially confusing, or unnecessary to achieve the object of
the proposals.
The new U.S. articles on the coastal seabed economic area 08 seek to
resolve these problems by clearly establishing coastal state exclusive resource management jurisdiction, subject to treaty obligations protecting
other uses of the area and including an obligation to share revenues from
a part of the area. In his Oceans Policy Statement of May 23, 1970,
President Nixon indicated that the revenues should be used for international community purposes, particularly for the benefit of developing
66 USA: Draft United Nations convention on the international sea-bed area, supra
note 4.

rAfghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands, Singapore: Preliminary working paper, supra note 11.
68 USA: Draft articles for a chapter on the rights and duties of States in coastal
sea-bed economic area, supra note 44.
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countries. The new articles submitted by certain landlocked and shelflocked states take a similar approach but provide for differences in the
rate of contribution by developed and developing coastal states. Canada,
the United Kingdom, and others have also endorsed revenue-sharing systems as a means of solving the problem of the outer limit of coastal state
seabed resource jurisdiction. In view of the very sharp dispute that
erupted last summer among the economic zone supporters over whether
the outer limit should be 200 miles alone, or 200 miles or the edge of the
continental margin, a number of countries will doubtless be considering
revenue sharing as a means of bridging this gap.
Another approach would involve benefit-sharing arrangements among
states in the same region. The problems, of course, are that most developed states are not in the same region as most developing countries,
that the distribution of resources off different continents is by no means
equal, and that certain coastal developing countries that could qualify
for a significant share of international benefits on the basis of need under
an international system would in essence only be donors under a regional
system. Nonetheless, the states of Africa, which has the largest number
of landlocked countries, and perhaps the smallest resource potential off
most of its coast of all the continents, have indicated strong inclinations
toward an exclusively regional solution to the allocation problem within
the 200-mile limit of an exclusive economic zone.
(2) Fisheries: Without in any way underestimating the importance of
seabed mineral resources, the complexity of the fisheries problem is probably without parallel in the law of the sea negotiations. There appear to
be few if any states that would be unaffected by alterations in the international rules affecting the supply of protein from the sea. Fish will disregard jurisdictional lines in the ocean drawn by man, fisherman will follow
the fish, and those trying to regulate the fishermen and protect the fish will
inevitably be faced with a problem transcending purely national solutions.
Despite the silence of some proposals on some of the issues, there appears to be wide agreement that any fisheries regime should promote the
following objectives:
(i) Conservation. Overfishing can seriously reduce the availability of
fish for future years, with adverse impact both on protein supply and on
those who derive their livelihood from the fishing.
(ii) Maximum utilization. Underutilization of renewable resources is
wasteful and clearly undersirable in view of the global need for inexpensive sources of animal protein.
(iii) Equitable allocation. It appears to be widely recognized that
the coastal state should, in principle, have first call on access to fish stocks
off its coast to the extent of its capacity to fish. Coastal fishing fleets cannot, and normally do not, fish far from their home base, and thus have no
economic alternative to fishing close to home. The problems of accommodating the preference of two or more coastal states to the same stock,
of allocating the remainder, and of dealing with the situation in which the
current fishing capacity of all coastal and other vessels with respect to a
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stock exceeds what can be caught, consistently with adequate conservation
measures, are among the most difficult and controversial issues. Most
proposals provide at least for access under stated conditions for other
states in the region, including landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states.
(iv) Economic efficiency. There is growing concern that excess fishing capacity, at least in some areas, is causing smaller economic returns,
raising the price of fish, and complicating efforts to ensure conservation
and equitable allocation of fish stocks. However, this is largely a problem
of the type of management measures adopted rather than of the jurisdiction to manage, and is therefore largely outside the scope of the Law
of the Sea Conference.
It is also generally recognized that any law of the sea treaty will necessarily have to be accompanied by continuing international fisheries arrangements of a bilateral, regional, or special global character. Every comprehensive proposal dealing with fisheries refers to these arrangements
either in mandatory or permissive terms.
The fisheries proposals' submitted deal with three types of questions
among others: jurisdiction to manage fisheries and coordination of fisheries management; conservation and other duties of the manager; and
allocation. All are to some extent interrelated.
Proposals for a 200-mile economic zone entail coastal state management jurisdiction within the zone. A number include provisions for management by international or regional organizations beyond the zone.
The draft articles on fisheries submitted by Canada, India, Kenya,
Madagascar, Senegal, and Sri Lanka 69 include an exclusive fishery zone
coterminous with the exclusive economic zone and are in essence an elaboration of the concept. These articles include additional management
provisions on specific fisheries problems:
(i) They recognize the coastal state's special interest in the maintenance
of the productivity of living resources in the area adjacent to the zone and
give it preferential rights to those resources based on harvesting capacity,
and authority to take measures pursuant thereto.
(ii) The states of a region may regulate living resources beyond the
zone when the resources are of limited migratory habits and breed, feed,
and survive on the resources of the region.
(iii) In respect of fisheries of highly migratory habits outside the limits
of the zone, regulations would be made by the authority designated for
that purpose.
(iv) A blank article is included on "anadromous species," such as salmon, which breed in rivers but migrate far out to sea.
The Australia-New Zealand paper 70 states that the basic concept would
be to establish coastal state responsibilities and control over the coastal
69 Canada, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Sri Lanka: Draft articles on
fisheries, supra note 45.
7 oAustralia and New Zealand: Principles for a fisheries r6gime, supra note 45.
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species, described as nonsedentary, free swimming species that inhabit
nutrient bearing areas adjacent to the coast.
The U.S. draft articles 71 do not include a specific limit, but provide
for coastal state jurisdiction over coastal species to the full extent of their
migratory range offshore, jurisdiction by the coastal state of origin over
anadromous species such as salmon throughout their migratory range beyond the territorial sea, and management of highly migratory species such
as tuna by international or regional organizations. They also provide for
agreement among coastal states with respect to coastal and anadromous
species that migrate through waters adjacent to more than one coastal
state, and for notice and consultation with other states concerned.
The Soviet draft article 72 preserves the regulatory functions of existing
international fisheries organizations for the future but provides that, in
areas where they do not exist, the coastal state may establish measures
itself in areas directly adjacent to a 12-mile limit, in agreement with states
also engaged in fishing in the areas. However, this does not include jurisdiction over allocation except that preferential rights based on harvesting
capacity would be accorded to the coastal state of origin with respect to
anadromous species and to developing coastal states with respect to other
species in areas directly adjacent to a 12-mile limit.
The Japanese draft articles73 provide for coastal state special interests
and preferential rights in adjacent waters, to be implemented by agreement
with other states concerned. Highly migratory and anadromous species
would be exempt from such special interests and rights. The draft articles
of Uganda and Zambia7 provide for administration of fisheries jurisdiction
in the exclusive economic zone by all states in a region or subregion.
These proposals indicate that the practical approaches to problems of
jurisdiction over fisheries management are not nearly as far apart as their
philosophical premises. All of them appear to be amenable to elaboration
in a manner that adequately takes into account the migratory characteristics of different species of fish. If this is done, the major issue would be
the extent to which a coastal state must share or coordinate its management responsibilities with other states in the region and with states fishing
in the area. Since it is obvious that this will have to be done in any
coastal region where stocks of fish migrate off the coast of more than one
state, the problem narrows to one of management participation by landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states and by distant-water
fishing states.
The proposed duties of the coastal state as fisheries manager relate primarily to the global interest in maintaining and increasing the short and
long-term supply of protein from the sea at minimum possible cost: by conservation measures assuring that fishing does not exceed levels which ensure
maximum stock levels of future generations of a stock, and by maximum
71 USA: Revised draft fisheries articles, supra note 45.
7-USSR: Draft article on fishing, supra note 45.
73 Japan: Proposals for a r6gime of fisheries on the high seas, supra note 45.
7 Uganda and Zambia: Draft articles on the proposed economic zone, supra note 42.
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utilization assuring that restrictions on fishing do not produce lesser yields
than can be taken within sound conservation limits.
While the United States has stressed these coastal state obligations,
many proposals regarding an exclusive economic zone are silent in this
respect. However, Canada has endorsed them, and the Australia-New
Zealand articles contain them. The proponents of articles that omit such
duties argue that obligations of this character are not necessary, as it is
in the interests of the coastal state to ensure conservation, and that the
coastal state has every reason to permit maximum utilization, if it can
collect some economic rent, presumably in the form of license fees. Others
argue that the record of states with respect to land and marine animals
within their jurisdiction indicates that this premise is open to serious
doubt. Species have been disastrously handled in some instances, and
even regulated access by foreign fishermen to internal waters and the territorial sea is the exception rather than the rule despite the fact that not
all species in those areas are fully exploited by coastal state fishermen.
All proposals contemplate that the coastal state can at least reserve to
its own vessels that portion of a stock of coastal species that its vessels
can harvest and that this preference would increase with harvesting capacity, although the Soviet articles provide for the continuation of existing
regional arrangements and exclude developed coastal states. The Japanese
articles restrict the preference to a "major portion" of the stock and contain special limitations on the preferential rights of developed coastal states.
In the absence of special provisions, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
would presumably include an exclusive or preferential right with respect
to anadromous and highly migratory species in the zone as well as coastal
species. The U.S. and Soviet proposals apply a preferential right to
anadromous species throughout their migratory range, which is frequently
well beyond 200 miles; the Japanese proposal excludes anadromous species.
The U.S. and Japanese proposals exclude highly migratory species from
coastal state jurisdiction. The effect of the articles introduced by Canada
and others in respect to highly migratory and anadromous species is unclear,
although Canada has endorsed control of anadromous species by the coastal
state of origin.
Assuming agreement on a duty to ensure maximum utilization of stocks,
the issue is who may fish for portions of stocks subject to a coastal state
preference that are not for the time being fully utilized by the coastal state.
The options appear to include coastal state discretion at one extreme and
nondiscrimination at the other. The effect of a number of proposals is to
give priority to neighboring states, particularly landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states, to states that have traditionally fished in
the area, or to both groups in one or another order.
The traditional fishing issue is an important but very narrow one; it
arises only when the sum total of the coastal state's harvesting capacity
and traditional fishing levels exceed 100% of the allowable catch. In
essence, it is a problem of transition. Extreme solutions would involve
either permitting the coastal state preference to expand without reference
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to traditional fishing or, on the other hand, preventing any expansion of
the preference when the combined total of coastal state harvesting capacity
and traditional fishing levels reaches 1007. Intermediate solutions might
include gradual phase-out or systems of compensation. The problem is a
major one primarily in the Northern hemisphere. It should be noted that
general acceptance of a solution to this and perhaps other problems could
be facilitated if it were made clear that traditional fishing provisions -apply
only to fishing that occurred before entry into force of the treaty, and that
no new or increased traditional fishing rights can accrue by virtue of new
or increased foreign fishing that may be permitted after the treaty enters
into force.
Virtually nothing has been said in the Seabed Committee about allocation
with respect to highly migratory species. Their migratory habits not only
render effective regulation and conservation virtually impossible without
international agreement but seriously complicate any attempt to apply a
geographic system of coastal state preferences. Indeed, attempts to do so
could render a significant part of every state's tuna fleet useless for most of
the season. However, international tuna commissions have given special
treatment to developing coastal states, and these precedents provide every
reason to think that coastal state interests could be accommodated by a
system of international management that ensures coastal state participation
and equitable allocation.
IV.
PoLLuinoN A3Nm ScaNnFxc REsERcH-SuBco nTnEE III

The mandate of Subcommittee III was functional rather than territorial:
it was to deal with the problems of pollution and scientific research everywhere in the oceans. The preparations to date, however, have made clear
that the critical problems lie in the area of coastal state jurisdiction beyond
the territorial sea, and this largely coincides, as far as jurisdictional issues
are concerned, with the work of Subcommittee II. Most exclusive economic zone proposals have provided for coastal state jurisdiction over pollution and scientific research within the economic zone.
Pollution
Questions relating to the prevention of marine pollution were largely
disregarded during the early phases of the preparatory work of the Seabed
Committee with no proposals formally submitted until the spring of 1973.
Consequently the preparatory work is incomplete, and several major issues,
such as the jurisdiction to take enforcement measures against vessels, were
not considered in any depth or detail. However, the number of major
pollution control issues being considered is fairly small, and the proposals
tabled generally cover a broad spectrum of alternatives on those major
issues.
The Working Group on Marine Pollution was established late in the
summer 1972 session of the Seabed Committee and began substantive
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meetings in March 1973. Only six proposals Ir were presented in March
and only four of these (Australia, Canada, Malta, and the USSR) were
comprehensive. Two texts were agreed, on the general and particular obligations of states to prevent pollution and to protect the marine environment.7 6 The summer session produced seven more proposals,"' of which
five were comprehensive (U.S., France, Kenya, Norway, and a four-power
draft from Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay) and two dealt only
with enforcement (Netherlands and Japan). During the summer session,
texts were prepared, either agreed or in the alternative, on global and
regional cooperation, monitoring, technical assistance, international standards, and national standards78 There was some discussion of texts on
enforcement but no agreement on draft articles. Questions of liability and
responsibility, exemption of military vessels and aircraft, and compulsory
dispute settlement were not discussed.
The language of all of the proposals on the general and particular obligations of states to prevent pollution and to protect the marine environment is quite vague, as were the agreed drafts produced at the spring
session7 9 However, during the negotiations in the spring session many
developing countries strongly supported the inclusion of language such as
"using for this purpose the best practicable means in accordance with their
capabilities" to ensure that the obligations were qualified and not absolute.
7 Australia: Working paper on preservation of the marine environment, UN Doe.
A/AC.138/SC.Im/L.27 (March 6, 1973); Canada: Draft articles for a comprehensive
marine pollution convention, UN Doe.A/AC.138/SC.III/L.28 (March 9, 1973); USSR:
Draft articles for a convention on general principles for the preservation of the marine
environment, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.Ill/L.32 (March 15, 1973); Malta: Draft artides for the preservation of the marine environment (including, inter alia, the prevention of pollution), UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.33 (March 16, 1973); Netherlands:
Observations concerning the preservation of the marine environment including the
prevention of marine pollution, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.35 (March 23, 1973);
USA: Worldng paper on competence to establish standards for the control of vessel
source pollution, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.36 (April 2, 1973).
76
R eport of Subcommittee HI, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (hereinafter cited as REP.
of SC.IH) 28 REP. I, 86-88 (1973).
77 USA: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.IHI/L.40 (July 13, 1973); Kenya:
Draft articles on prevention and control of pollution in the marine environment, UN
Doe. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.41 (July 16, 1973); Norway: Draft articles on the protection
of the marine environment against pollution, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/LA3 (July
19, 1973); France: Draft articles concerning the rights exercisable by coastal States
for the purpose of preventing marine pollution, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.46 (July
20, 1973); Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay: Working paper on the preservation of the marine environment, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.47 and Corr. 1 (July
24 and 26, 1973); Netherlands: Draft articles on the enforcement of international provisions for the prevention of marine pollution from vessels, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC.III/
LA8 (Aug. 10, 1973); Japan: Proposal on enforcement measures by coastal States
for the purpose of preventing marine pollution, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.49
(Aug. 13, 1973).
78 RE. of SC.IH, supra note 76, at 91-102.
79 Id., at 86-88.
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During the summer, this approach culminated in proposals to require that
economic factors, including the stage of development of individual countries, be taken into account in both the formulation and implementation
of all marine pollution control standards. After lengthy discussion and
opposition to these proposals by many developed states, including the
U.S. and Canada, alternative texts were formulated on the question of
global and regional cooperation to establish standards, one of which included a general reference to economic factors and the other of which
did notY8
Texts were also agreed during the summer on technical assistance and
monitoring.81 The technical assistance text requires states to promote
programs of scientific, technical, educational, and other assistance to developing countries for pollution control, to provide assistance for minnimizing the effects of major pollution incidents, and to develop contingency
plans to deal with such incidents. The monitoring text requires states to
"employ suitable systems of observation, measurement, evaluation and
analysis to determine the risk or effect of pollution on the marine environment" and "to disseminate . . . data and information obtained . . . to

states likely to be affected and to the international organizations concerned."
The discussion of the source of pollution control standards and the jurisdiction to prescribe standards consumed over two weeks of meetings during
the summer session. Although there was some narrowing of alternatives
and consolidation of positions, the Working Group was only able to produce a lengthy series of alternative texts, two on land-based pollution, six
on seabed-based pollution, six on vessel-source pollution, and three specifically on the competence of individual states to establish and adopt
standards.
The two alternatives on land-based pollution standards are a text requiring states to adopt national standards and to endeavor to establish
international standards and a separate ten-word text simply requiring states
to take appropriate measures. 82
On seabed-source pollution,83 the basic issue was whether or not there
should be a minimum floor of internationally established standards that each
state would be required to apply to economic activities in the seabed
area under its jurisdiction. Most states did support a minimum floor of
standards for seabed economic activities, with the coastal state having the
right to apply its own higher standards; but a group of countries opposed
minimum international standards as being inconsistent with the exclusive economic zone concept. While a number of states wanted the new
Seabed Authority to prescribe the international standards, others were quite
reluctant to agree to that concept, at least before the structure of the Authority is fully negotiated.
On the question of the source of international standards for vesselpollution control,8 4 two of the six alternative texts proposed the establishso Id., at 91.
82 Id., at 93.
81 Id., at 95-98.

81 Id., at 92-93.
83

Id., at 94-95.
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ment of international standards by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, while one specified the Seabed Authority, and
another the United Nations Environment Program. One supported international standards generally, while another stated that no standards higher
than those of the flag state should be applied to vessels.
The most controversial item in the discussion of pollution standards
was whether the coastal state would have the right to set higher standards
for vessels transiting a large zone off its coast. The issue is clearly presented in the three alternative texts on the competence of individual states
to establish standards.8 5
One approach would require all vessels to comply with the internationally
agreed standards, and would allow higher standards to be applied by flag
states to their own vessels and by port states to vessels entering their ports
but would not allow higher coastal state standards in other respects. The
states supporting this approach argued that standards should generally be
uniform to enable compliance and that both navigational and environmental
interests should be taken into account when standards are formulated, which
would be more likely in international negotiations than if coastal states fix
the standards. They pointed out that special standards for special areas or
regions could be formulated through the international process.
Another approach would allow a coastal state to apply special standards
in a zone beyond its territorial sea whenever, in its view, adequate international standards have not been established; some of the states supporting this concept would support port state and flag state rights in addition, while some would oppose port state rights. The basic arguments
for this approach are that the drawing-up of international standards will be
a slow process and that flag and port states will not adequately protect
coastal states' environmental interests.
A third approach, while permitting coastal state standards in a broad area,
would require that such standards not be incompatible with standards
adopted by developing states for their flag vessels.
The issue of a coastal state's rights to prescribe and enforce rules in
a zone raises a very serious threat of interference with navigation in such
a zone. Those who oppose a pollution control zone basically argue that
such coastal state rights are unnecessary and that such rights are completely different in kind from the economic rights, need for which is the
basic impetus for a zone of coastal jurisdiction. In this connection, it was
noted that shipping to and from a majority of coastal states, while en route,
would have to pass within 200 miles of at least one other state, and would
accordingly be subject to interference if coastal states were given jurisdiction to establish pollution standards for vessels transiting the area.
Questions of enforcement were briefly discussed but the Working Group
could not agree on the presentation of alternative texts. The U.S. proposal 8 relies on flag state enforcement against its vessels, port state en85 Id., at 98-100.

86 USA: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution, supra note 77.
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forcement against vessels entering its ports regardless of where the viola-

tion took place (the Netherlands proposal also includes this right),

7

and

two types of extraordinary coastal state action-enforcement in emergency

situations threatening major harmful damage to the coast and enforcement
against all vessels of a certain flag as authorized by the dispute settlement tribunal after finding that the flag state has persistently and unreasonably failed to take enforcement measures against its vessels.
Other proposals, including those of Australia, 8 Canada,8 9 Kenya,90 and
the four-power draft,91 depend basically on coastal state enforcement in a
zone beyond the territorial sea. (Canada and Kenya also specifically inlude flag state enforcement duties). France 92 and Japan8 3 proposed
limited coastal state enforcement in a zone beyond the territorial sea.
Japan proposed rights of investigation and prosecution for violation of international standards regarding dumping and discharge. The French
proposal would allow coastal state investigation in a zone for violation of
certain conventions but would permit prosecution in only two special circumstances of violations of the Ocean Dumping Convention.94
The problem of preventing pollution from ships relates in important respects to the problem of protecting navigation. It arises, for example, in
connection with the territorial sea, particularly straits, in connection with
proposals regarding archipelagos, and in connection with proposals for
coastal state pollution controls over ships beyond the territorial sea, either
in an "economic zone" or in some other manner. An adequate accommodation of navigational concerns with proposals for coastal state jurisdiction
over pollution is not easily achieved. It becomes difficult to distinguish
between pollution control jurisdiction over navigation and the sort of jurisdiction exercised in a territorial sea. A large number of states ,6ould be
very adversely affected by the exercise of broad jurisdiction over pollution.
The issue of state responsibility and liability was not discussed but
several proposals have been tabled. Canada 95 and Kenya 91 provide for
87 Netherlands: Draft articles on the enforcement of international provisions for the
prevention
of marine pollution from vessels, supra note 77.
8
8 Australia: WVorking paper on preservation of the marine environment, supra note 75.
60 Canada: Draft articles for a comprehensive marine pollution convention, supra
note 75.
90
Kenya: Draft articles on prevention and control of pollution in the marine environment, supra note 77.
91 Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay: Working paper on the preservation of
the marine environment, supra note 77.
92France: Draft articles concerning the rights exercisable by coastal States for
the purpose of preventing marine pollution, supra note 77.
93Japan: Proposal on enforcement measures by coastal States for the purpose of
preventing marine pollution, supra note 77.
9
4 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
other Matter. Adopted Nov. 13, 1972, not yet in force. 6 DEPT. STATE BULL. 711
(1972); 67 AJL 626 (1973); 11 ILM 1294 (1972).
05 Canada: Draft articles for a comprehensive marine pollution convention, supra
note 75.
08 Kenya: Draft articles on prevention and control of pollution in the marine environment, supra note 77.
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state liability for damage to areas under the jurisdiction of another state,
require local remedies in each state, and call for the development of international law on compensation; the U.S. proposal also includes the last two
items. 97 Australia 98 provides for state liability but does not elaborate
further. The United States,99 Norwegian, 09 and four-power 10 ' articles
provide for general state responsibility, with the United States imposing
additional requirements as noted above.
On the question of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity, which was
not discussed, four proposals, by Canada,102 the United States, 03 Australia,104 and France 0 5 follow the precedents in other pollution treaties
and state that the provisions shall not apply to such vessels.
Finally, four proposals, those of Malta,100 the United States, 07 Canada,0 s
France, 10 9 and Australia,'" all would require compulsory settlement of all
pollution disputes, either by arbitration or through a tribunal.
Scientific Research
Six comprehensive working papers and articles on scientific research
were introduced in Subcommittee III."' Two additional proposals were
97USA: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution, supra note 77.
S Australia: Working paper on preservation of the marine environment, supra note 75.
99 USA: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution, supra note 77.
1o Norway: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment against pollution, supra note 77.
01 Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay: Working paper on the preservation of
the marine environment, supra note 77.
102 Canada: Draft articles for a comprehensive marine pollution convention, supra
note 75.
103 USA: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution, supra note 77.
10 Australia: Working paper on preservation of the marine environment, supra note
75.
105 France: Draft articles concerning the rights exercisable by coastal States for the
purpose of preventing marine pollution, supra note 77.
100 Malta: Draft articles for the preservation of the marine environment (including
inter alia, the prevention of pollution), supra note 75.
2o USA: Draft articles on the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution, supra note 77.
108 Canada: Draft articles for a comprehensive marine pollution convention, supra
note 75.
lo9 France: Draft articles concerning the rights exercisable by coastal States for the
purpose of preventing marine pollution, supra note 77.
110 Australia: Working paper on preservation of the marine environment, supra note
75.
111 Canada: Working paper on principles on marine scientific research, 27 REP. 20305 (1972); Bulgaria, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR: Draft articles
for a convention on scientific research in the world ocean, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IlI/
L.31 (March 15, 1973); Malta: Draft articles on scientific research, UN Doc. A/
AC.138/SC.III/L.34 (March 23, 1973); China: Working paper on marine scientific
research, UN Doec. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.42 (July 19, 1973); USA: Draft articles for
a chapter on marine scientific research, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.44 (July 19,
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presented on the specific question of coastal state consent for scientific
research in areas under its jurisdiction. The Working Group on Scientific
Research and Transfer of Technology was the last to begin work, and
could not consider all these draft articles or review the two texts prepared
during informal consultations. 112
The most critical law of the sea issue with respect to scientific research
is whether or not coastal state consent will be required to carry on scientific research in areas of coastal state resource jurisdiction.
Those arguing against a consent requirement emphasized the benefits of
research to the entire international community, noting that these related
to an understanding not only of the oceans but of the total global environment. Research in one locality could have an important bearing on a
problem of much more general scope. It was pointed out that, since resource exploration and exploitation would be subject to coastal state jurisdiction, the coastal state need not fear the effect of scientific research data,
but to the contrary could have much to gain from new information. Experience with consent requirements under the Continental Shelf Convention 1"' was cited in support of the view that these requirements constitute
an impediment to research and have unnecessarily caused increased costs,
delay, and cancellation of research projects.
It would appear from a variety of the proposals presented that a coastal
state's basic concerns, from a resource management point of view, are the
bona fides of the research project, participation in the research project,
availability of all data and samples, and, particularly in the case of developing coastal states, the technical means to assess the implications of
the research for its economic interests. Complex computer data and unanalyzed samples may not be very meaningful to a country with limited
indigenous research capabilities.
The two approaches most frequently discussed both appear to suffer
from a failure to accommodate the relevant interests involved in scientific
research within the area of coastal state economic jurisdiction. Freedom
of scientific research, as proposed by certain Eastern European countries,
places exclusive emphasis on the benefits of scientific research. A requirement of coastal state consent, as proposed by Canada, 1 4 China,"5 , and
Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay 1, gives similar priority to
coastal state interests.
Some see a compromise solution in terms of placing certain obligations
on the coastal state in connection with a requirement that consent be
1973); Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay: Working paper on

scientific research within the zone subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the
coastal State, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.45 (July 19, 1973).
112 P. of SC.III, part. III. B, Report of Working Group 3, supra note 76, at 102.
"13 Art. 5(8), supra note 2.
114 Canada: Working paper on principles on marine scientific research, supra note 111.
115

China: Working paper on marine scientific research, supra note 111.

116 Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay: Working paper on

scientific research within the zone subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the
coastal State, supra note 111.
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sought for the conduct of scientific research. Thus, for example, Italy proposed to deal with the not infrequent situations in which no response is
received from the coastal state for a long time, if at all, by presuming
consent in the absence of a reply within a certain period of time. Others,
such as the United States, see the compromise in terms of specifying certain
obligations regarding coastal state interests that would obviate the need for
consent and thereby avoid the dangers of unnecessary restrictions on scientific research.
Consistent with its general approach to oceans problems, Malta proposed resolving the problem through
international regulation of scientific
7
research beyond a 12-mile limit.
It would appear that a first step in solving the problem of scientific research in the area of coastal state economic jurisdiction might be to prepare a list of those specific obligations of the scientific researcher which
are necessary to protect coastal state interests in both seabeds resources
and fisheries. The list in the U.S. proposal Ill contains the following
elements:
(i) advance notification to the coastal state, including a description of
the project;
(ii) certification regarding bona fides of the project;
(iii) arrangements for coastal state participation;
(iv) sharing of all data and samples with the coastal state;
(v) open publication of results;
(vi) assistance to the coastal state in assessing the implications of the
research results for its economic interests; and
(vii) compliance with all applicable international environmental standards.
If such a list could be internationally agreed upon, the standards for
harmonizing the international and coastal interests would be established.
Compulsory dispute settlement procedures would then assure both the
coastal state and the scientist of adherence to those standards, of means
to resolve differences that might arise, and of a gradual development of
authoritative interpretation based on impartial respect for all the interests
involved.
V.
CONCLUSION

Those who discount the probability of chaos in the oceans if the Law of
the Sea Conference does not succeed generally seem to maintain that
there is existing law and proceed to explain their view of what the law is.
The Conference was called, not because there is no law, but because states
do not agree on many significant aspects of that law. The negotiations
reveal that they also do not agree (although to a significantly lesser degree) on what the law should be in the future. What precisely is left
117 Malta: Draft articles on scientific research, supra note 111.
118 USA: Draft articles for a chapter on marine scientific research,

supra note 111.
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of "international" law if states proceed increasingly to interpret it as best
suits their interests? "Custom and practice" is a convenient doctrine to
invoke in theory, and certainly has an important role. But how consistent
with our view of the world in which we want to live is a system that
requires acquiescence or resistance, against a clear historical background
of serious conflict over some of the issues?
In this situation, if a treaty is to be truly meaningful, it must not only
deal reasonably with all of the specific issues but, more importantly, it
must justify acquiescence in its terms on the basis of the broader purposes
of establishing an equitable system of order for the oceans.
To achieve this, the United States has stated in the clearest possible terms
that two elements are essential. First, the treaty must be widely accepted
by all segments of the international community. Second, means for the
peaceful and compulsory settlement of disputes arising under the treaty
must be ensured.
Reference has been made to the critical role of compulsory dispute settlement in connection with specific issues. Some more general elaboration
is relevant here.
The developing factual (as distinguished from legal) situation in the
oceans is one in which every country increasingly believes that it has, in
effect, the option of pronouncing and attempting to achieve relevant
acquiescence in its interpretation of the law, provided it is prepared to
run such risks as may be entailed. Such a system can operate through
existing customary law, or, in effect, through unilateral interpretation of
treaties. The degree to which this can be done in the case of a treaty
is largely a function of the specificity of the treaty and the legal talent
applied to the endeavor. Given the current trends in the law of the sea,
there is reason to believe the process might continue even if a treaty were
widely ratified. In the broadest sense, the purpose of the law of the sea
negotiations is to put an end to the direct relationship that such a system
entails between the enjoyment of a right and the application of power.
A system of compulsory, impartial, third-party adjudication is thus an
essential element of the overall structure.
For this reason, the United States has now complemented what amounts
to a comprehensive set of proposals on basic substantive issues involved
in the negotiations with new draft articles 119 providing for the resolution
by a new Law of the Sea Tribunal of disputes not settled by other means.
It may be hoped that the very existence of such procedures would enable
lawyers in their respective governments to keep even initial interpretations
within a fairly limited range. While the articles permit a variety of agreed
means for settling disputes, the choice of a new specialized tribunal rather
than the International Court of Justice was based on considerations of expertise, on the special "administrative law" functions the tribunal may have
in connection with the deep seabeds, and on the greater flexibility in al119 USA: Draft articles for a chapter on the settlement of disputes, UN Doc. A/
AC.138/97 (Aug. 21, 1973); 12 ILM 1220 (1973).
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lowing private parties to appear before such a tribunal in specific instances,
such as essentially "contractual" disputes under the international regime
for the deep seabeds. Of course, reference of a question of international
law to the International Court by the Tribunal is not precluded.
There is some reason to believe that the traditional difficulties in negotiating compulsory dispute settlement may be attenuated by the general
recognition that international interests of one type or another exist in
virtually all parts of the ocean and that those interests will be specifically
dealt with in the treaty. It might be noted, for example, that the fisheries
proposal of the USSR refers to arbitration.
This is all a very large order. And the time available is running short,
as unilateral actions and the pressure for such actions increase. Indeed
provisional application of certain aspects of a treaty before full entry into
force would appear to be necessary to take care of certain urgent problems,
particularly regarding the deep seabed and fisheries. If agreement is not
reached in the 'time schedule elaborated by the UN General Assembly, it
is problematic whether agreement can ever be achieved for a long time
to come, and then only after much unnecessary conflict and waste. Among
the riches and promises of the oceans, there is also great danger of chaos
and conflict; it is to be hoped that the danger is clearly perceived before
the community of nations discards its chance to defend itself with a just
and universally respected system of law.

